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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral 
intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of 
intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are 
construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s 
account of self-evidence. Next, I criticise his account on the basis of the idea of “adequate 
understanding.” I shall then present my alternative account of self-evidence which is 
based on the seeming account of intuition. Finally, I show how the seeming account of 
self-evidence can make the moral intuitionist epistemology more tenable. 
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1. The Concept of Self-evidence 
Robert Audi refines and categorises the idea of self-evidence, as he wants to shape 
his own view of moral intuitionism, which he has dubbed “ethical reflectionism.”1 
Moral intuitionists like Audi believe that some propositions are self-evident if, and 
only if, an understanding of them is sufficient justification for believing them, and 
is sufficient to know the proposition, provided one believes them on the basis of 
one’s understanding of them. He characterises self-evident propositions such that  
(1) if one can sufficiently understand them, then in the light of that 
understanding one is justified in believing them, and 
(2) if one believes them on the basis of that understanding, then one can know 
them.2 
                                                        
1 Robert Audi, “Self-Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 13 (1999): 205-228. 
2 Robert Audi, “Ethical Reflectionism,” The Monist 76 (1993): 303; Robert Audi, “Intuitionism, 
Pluralism, and the Foundation of Ethics,” in Moral Knowledge? New Readings in Moral 
Epistemology, eds. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University 
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Of course, one might know that p even if one does not know that p is self-
evident. In other words, “[w]e do not need to know that p is self-evident to know 
that p on the basis of an understanding of it.”3 Thus, for the sake of clarity, we can 
distinguish between  
(a) knowing a self-evident proposition 
and  
(b) knowing that this proposition is self-evident. 
Apprehending the truth of a self-evident proposition is one thing, but 
apprehending its self-evidence is another thing. It is the understanding of the truth 
of a self-evident proposition that is all a moral intuitionist needs to claim.4 Because 
one might know some self-evident propositions but might not know that they are 
self-evident. However, it is not true that (a) and (b) are not connected at all, for to 
know that a proposition is self-evident one needs at least to know the self-evident 
proposition in question based on adequate understanding.  
To illustrate, consider young children who know certain simple self-evident 
mathematical propositions, but do not even have the concept of self-evidence at 
all. Similarly, we can have rational and reasonable beliefs even if we do not have 
any beliefs about reasons. Parfit, for example, observes that  
Young children respond rationally to certain reasons or apparent reasons, though 
they do not yet have the concept of a reason.5 
When we refer to an adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition, 
provided one believes that proposition, this does not entail that one necessarily 
must believe it. Self-evident propositions are knowable on the basis of a sufficient 
understanding of them. But understanding does not necessarily cause one to 
                                                                                                                      
Press, 1996), 114; Robert Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral 
Judgment,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1998): 20-22; Robert Audi, “Moral Knowledge 
and Ethical Pluralism,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, eds. John Greco and Ernest Sosa 
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 283; Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge, 1998), 95. 
3 Philip Stratton-Lake, “Introduction,” in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed. Philip 
Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 20. See also Audi, “Intuitionism, 
Pluralism, and the Foundation of Ethics,” 106-107. 
4 Audi, “Ethical Reflectionism,” 286; Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundation of 
Ethics,” 107-108. 
5 Derek Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 118. 
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believe them. To understand a proposition entails “being able to apply it to (and 
withhold its application from) an apparently wide range of cases, and being able to 
see some of its logical implications.”6 If one does not have an ability to draw at least 
one inference from the proposition in question, one probably does not really 
understand the proposition. 
In Audi’s view, since self-evident propositions are those propositions one 
can justifiably believe on the basis of adequately understanding them alone, Audi’s 
view makes it sound like self-evident propositions must be all a priori truths.7 This 
is because on the one hand, for justifiably believing in self-evident propositions we 
merely need adequate understanding. On the other hand, this condition is what we 
need for justifiably believing a priori truths. Audi, for example, notes that this 
proposition is self-evident: “The mother-in-law of my father’s son-in-law is my 
mother.” If one has an adequate grasp of this proposition, one can know it to be 
true, provided that one believes it on the basis of this understanding. For self-
evident propositions are such that we can know them to be true on the basis of 
understanding them adequately, and need not to be known on the basis of any 
other things beyond a grasp of the proposition itself. Audi claims that such 
knowledge is non-inferential. 
According to Audi, we can distinguish the notion of self-evidence into two 
types, from two aspects in terms of understanding. First, we have “hard” self-
evident and “soft” self-evident propositions. Second, we have “immediately” self-
evident and “mediately” self-evident ones.8 A hard self-evident proposition is  
(1) strongly axiomatic, in the sense that there is no other proposition which is 
better justified than it, (2) immediately understandable, in the sense that it does 
not need reflection to be understood, (3) indefeasibly justified and (4) cognitively 
compelling, in the sense that if one understands it one cannot resist believing it.9 
                                                        
6 Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” 22. 
7 There is a further question whether all a priori propositions are self-evident. I will discuss this 
issue later. 
8 Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” 22, 24; Audi, “Ethical 
Reflectionism,” 303; Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundation of Ethics,” 284; Robert 
Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 48-54. 
9 Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” 24; Audi, The Good in 
the Right, 53. 
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However, Audi believes that a soft self-evident proposition has none of these 
features. Soft self-evidence, Audi thinks, can hold for all Rossian pro tanto duties.10 
Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that Audi is committed to an exhaustive 
dichotomy between hard and soft self-evidence. Perhaps there is a continuum from 
completely soft (none of (1)-(4)) to completely hard (all of (1)-(4)). If so, then a 
proposition that has some but not all of (1)-(4) can still be a hardish proposition. 
Audi believes that hard self-evident propositions are often found in logic 
and mathematics. So, comparing self-evident moral propositions such as pro tanto 
principles to mathematical propositions is an epistemological mistake, which some 
classic moral intuitionists, e.g. Ross, committed. Audi thinks that “moderate 
intuitionism” does not commit this mistake. He writes, for example, “I believe that 
the kind of self-evidence to which a moderate intuitionism is committed lies quite 
far at the soft end.”11 
Although most “hard” self-evident propositions such as many mathematical 
and logical propositions are justified non-inferentially, there are at least some hard 
self-evident propositions, e.g. “every integer greater than one, either is prime itself 
or is the product of prime numbers”, that can be justified inferentially. Likewise, 
“soft” self-evident propositions can be justified inferentially. “Hard” self-evident 
propositions are often accepted at first sight, but “soft” self-evident propositions 
need reflection in order to be persuasive.12 Of course, reflection and mental 
maturity are matters of degree, but this does not entail that the justification that 
emerges after further reflection must be inferential.13 
Being a self-evident proposition does not entail that it is obvious to 
everyone. Some self-evident propositions may need lots of reflection to believe. 
However, there are some self-evident propositions that can be accepted easily 
without any effort. Of course, people might not believe a self-evident proposition if 
                                                        
10 Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” 24. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Audi, “Ethical Reflectionism,” 303; Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundation of 
Ethics,” 115. 
13 For further details on self-evidence, see Laurence BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason: A 
Rationalistic Account of A Priori Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Also, for the issue of self-evidence and rational disagreement, see Robert Audi, “Intuition, 
Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, 5 (2008): 
488-491. As a criticism of Audi’s epistemological intuitionism particularly on self-evidence, see 
Klemens Kappel, “Challenges to Audi’s Ethical Intuitionism,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 
5, 4 (2002): 391-413. 
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they do not understand it. And some people cannot know a self-evident 
proposition because they believe it on the basis of inadequate understanding.14 
Furthermore, an immediately self-evident proposition is, Audi says, “readily 
understood by normal adults,” in the sense that its truth is immediately obvious or 
clear upon the understanding. Mediately self-evident propositions, however, are 
endorsed or accepted “only through reflection on them.”15 For example, a 
proposition like “the bachelor is an unmarried man” is an immediately self-evident 
proposition. Audi himself uses the phrase “luminously self-evident” when he wants 
to talk about very clear propositions which do not need reflection to accept them.16 
However, consider for instance the self-evident proposition introduced by Audi as 
a self-evident proposition which is not obvious and needs further reflection to find 
its truth or falsity: “if there have never been any siblings, there have never been 
any first cousins.”17 Whenever propositions are self-evidently true (no matter 
whether the self-evidence is immediate and hard, or soft and mediate), they are 
knowable non-inferentially, or, as Audi says, “[i]f they are even mediately self-
evident, they may be taken to be knowable non-inferentially.”18 
Nevertheless, one might be sceptical of how Audi’s discussion of reflection 
generally is supposed to work. Although there are some moral self-evident 
propositions mediated through reflection, we need to be clear about what the 
consequence of this claim is. How is it possible that one reflects on a self-evident 
proposition but still remains non-inferentially justified?  
In order to explain how moral self-evident propositions mediated through 
reflections work, we should discuss what it means when we say that moral self-
evident propositions might have both inferential and non-inferential justification. 
Although Audi does not use this terminology, in the next section, I introduce a 
distinction between two concepts, i.e. “self-evident truth” and “self-evident 
justification,” to give a plausible explanation of how reflection might work in 
Audi’s framework. This distinction, I believe, helps us to have a better 
understanding of the contemporary moral intuitionist epistemology.  
 
                                                        
14 Audi, “Ethical Reflectionism,” 303. 
15 Audi, “Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment,” 22. 
16 Audi, The Good in the Right, 31. 
17 Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundation of Ethics,” 114. 
18 Audi, The Good in the Right, 23. 
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1.1. Self-Evidently Justified vs. Self-Evidently True   
Immediately self-evident propositions like “all vixens are female” do not need a 
high level of understanding for justification, according to Audi’s version of self-
evidence. We easily and immediately accept and believe the proposition “all vixens 
are female” (if we know the meaning of vixen). Immediately self-evident 
propositions, of which we can realise the truth instantly, are “self-evidently true” 
to us. These self-evident propositions are presented to us as true and we do not 
need any further reflection to believe them. 
On the other hand, although there are some immediately self-evident 
propositions which are self-evidently true, and everybody can understand and 
accept their truth at first sight, there are also some mediately self-evident 
propositions which might not be known easily and need further reflection to be 
understood adequately. Such further reflection might involve drawing inferences 
from the proposition so as to better understand it. But this does not entail that they 
cannot be non-inferentially justified. Because one might know some self-evident 
propositions non-inferentially but might know that they are self-evident 
inferentially. 
Mediately self-evident propositions do need further reflection. Reflection is 
needed to have an adequate understanding of the proposition. The truth or falsity 
of this sort of proposition is not known before reflection and at first sight. It is 
possible that a proposition that one considers to be self-evidently true may turn out 
not to be true, as we see after more and more reflection.19 
Nevertheless, to reject a proposition based on reflection does not imply that 
the proposition was not initially intuitive or non-inferential. As an example, in 
Copernican physics, there are some axioms or postulates that were thought to be 
self-evident. The scientific community then saw the emergence of Newtonian or 
Einsteinian physics, which has some parallel self-evident axioms.20 This illustrates 
the possibility that an apparently self-evident proposition may be shown to be 
incorrect after further reflection by other scholars in one scientific society. 
                                                        
19 Philip Stratton-Lake, “Pleasure and Reflection in Ross,” in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations 
ed. Stratton-Lake, 113-136.   
20 As another example, the Ptolemaic model of the solar system as being geocentric was “self-
evident” but was later overturned by the Copernican model of the solar system, a heliocentric 
model. Neither classical mechanics nor relativity disprove Copernican heliocentric model. 
Rather heliocentricity disproves the Ptolemaic model.  
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Similarly, this could happen in the area of morality when we discover that some 
apparently self-evident moral propositions are not true.21 
Since it is hard to accept mediately self-evident propositions at first sight, 
one can think that these propositions are not self-evident. We might need further 
reflection to understand them adequately as self-evident. The more we reflect on a 
proposition, the better we find out whether it is self-evident or not. However, to 
know (justify) that some mediately self-evident propositions are actually self-
evident, some further inferences might be needed. Thus, since some inferences 
might be needed to know that some mediately self-evident propositions are 
actually self-evident, it is better to call mediately self-evident propositions “self-
evidently justified.” 
2. Evaluating and Developing Audian Self-Evidence 
Sidgwick tried to establish a systematic account of self-evidence, i.e. to elaborate 
what it is for a proposition to be self-evident. He mentioned at least three 
conditions for self-evident propositions: (1) the proposition must be a clear and 
precise proposition; (2) reflection needs to ascertain the proposition’s self-evidence; 
(3) self-evident propositions must be consistent. Sidgwick believes that these 
conditions are for “a significant proposition, apparently self-evident, in the highest 
degree of certainty attainable.”22 Parfit clarifies Sidgwick’s view about self-
evidence in this way: 
When Sidgwick calls our knowledge of some normative truths intuitive, he is not 
referring to any special faculty. Sidgwick means that we can recognize the truth 
of some normative beliefs by considering only the content of these beliefs, or 
what we are believing. These beliefs do not need to be inferred from other beliefs. 
Sidgwick also calls some of these beliefs self-evident. In using this word, Sidgwick 
                                                        
21 I said “apparently self-evident moral propositions” here because in Audi’s view a proposition 
cannot really be self-evident without being true. If Audi’s account of self-evident is correct, a 
self-evident proposition cannot turn out to be false. An apparently self-evident one can, 
however. Compare this with the claim made by Hooker, who wrote that a proposition can seem 
to be self-evidently true and yet turn out to be false. See Brad Hooker, “Intuitions and Moral 
Theorizing,” in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations, ed. Stratton-Lake, 161-183. Audi’s account 
of self-evidence has some shortcomings, I believe. I will explain my criticisms later. 
22 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edition (London: Macmillan, 1967 [1874]), 211-
212, 342-388. Sidgwick also says that self-evident propositions must be agreed upon or at least 
agreed upon by experts, but he does not explain why experts should have any special weight 
here. 
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does not mean that such beliefs are infallible. These beliefs, he claims, may need 
careful reflection, and they may be false. Such beliefs may merely seem to be self-
evident. These beliefs may also be indubitable, or intrinsically credible. Such 
credibility is a matter of degree.23 
Now recall Audi’s account of self-evident propositions. In almost the same 
way, he believes that self-evident propositions are propositions, the sufficient 
understanding of which provides sufficient justification for believing and knowing 
them; or a proposition is self-evident when it is a truth, such that a sufficient 
understanding of it satisfies the two conditions below.24 Audi’s description of self-
evidence, then, becomes  
Audian Self-evidence: A self-evident proposition is a truth such that  
(a) In virtue of having an adequate understanding of the proposition, one is 
justified in believing it. 
(b) If one believes the proposition on the basis of an adequate understanding of it, 
then one knows it. 
Some critics such as Tropman believe that Audi’s account of self-evidence 
does not explicitly make room for particular self-evident propositions.25 This is 
because Audi himself admits that his view rules out the self-evident particular 
moral truths.26 Audi grants that moral intuitionists need only claim for the general 
self-evident moral principles or “generic intuitionism.”27 In Tropman’s view, while 
Audi’s notion of self-evidence helps us to see how general moral truths such as 
Rossian principles of pro tanto duty are evident to us in themselves, his account 
does not care about the self-evidence of particular moral truths, such as those 
moral truths in concrete cases. Yet, in what sense are particular propositions self-
evident if not in Audi’s sense?  
Tropman would argue that we could still have particular self-evident 
propositions in Audi’s sense like general ones, although his account does not 
                                                        
23 Parfit, On What Matters, Vol. 2, 490. 
24 Robert Audi, “Conclusion,” in The New Intuitionism, ed. Jill Graper Hernandez (London: 
Continuum, 2011), 174; Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 247. 
25 Elizabeth Tropman, “Renewing Moral Intuitionism,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6, 4 (2009): 
450. 
26 Audi, The Good in the Right, 69; Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, and the Foundation of 
Ethics,” 109.  
27 Audi, The Good in the Right, 55, 49; Audi, “Conclusion,” 172.  
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explicitly entail that. In her view, we can develop Audi’s account to cover a non-
inferential real-world-particular knowledge of moral facts. For example, consider a 
particular propositional belief such as “the lie my brother told yesterday was pro 
tanto wrong.” Tropman believes that we can learn substantive moral facts about 
the action in question solely by reflecting on the conceptual meaning of “my 
brother’s action.” A particular act of lying is self-evidently wrong because 
knowledge of self-evident truths depends totally on the conceptual meaning of the 
constituents. So, the proposition can be qualified as self-evidently true. 
Furthermore, we can argue that if the general principle, say, lying is wrong, 
is self-evident, then it will be self-evident that any particular act of lying would be 
wrong. If the general proposition is self-evident, why cannot the particular 
instance be? For example, if it is self-evident that the fact that an act counts as a lie 
is a pro tanto reason not to do the act, then how could it not also be self-evident 
that the fact that this particular act counts as a lie is a pro tanto reason not to do 
the act? Hence, once again Tropman would maintain, Audian self-evidence should 
take into consideration a non-inferential real-world-particular knowledge of moral 
facts. 
However, one might object that this kind of arguing can be problematic in 
some cases. It is true that in some moral cases if there can be self-evident general 
propositions, then there can be self-evident particular ones too. For instance, if it is 
pro tanto wrong to rape someone for pleasure, it is also self-evidently wrong that 
Jack rapes Jill. However, this cannot be true in any case of, say, mathematics or 
geometry. For example, if it is self-evident that any triangle’s angles sum up to 180 
degrees, then it is not self-evident that this triangle’s angles sum up to 180 degrees. 
The reason for this is that it is not self-evident that “this is a triangle,” rather it is 
something we establish by looking at the object, not by a priori reflection. 
Nonetheless, one can respond to this objection that, as far as conditional 
propositions can be self-evident, a proposition such as “if this is a triangle, its 
angles sum to 180,” looks like an intuition about a particular self-evident in 
geometry. In fact, by having established that this is a triangle we can know straight 
off that this triangle has 180 degrees. 
Whether or not my argument or Tropman’s argument for particular self-
evident moral knowledge can work, we certainly can think of different moral 
particular self-evident propositions in our daily life. It seems obvious that a 
particular truth may be adequately understood, so it may be known on the basis of 
that sufficient understanding. For example, in the case of my brother’s lie or a 
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proposition such as “my friend killed her husband for fun,” we can have a morally 
relevant particular self-evident proposition by reflecting on the nature of a lie or 
killing. Following some classic intuitionists who take into account particular self-
evidence, we can take a broad view about particular self-evident propositions in 
terms of adequate understanding.  
For example, Clarke and Prichard, as two classic intuitionists, tended to seek 
self-evident propositions more often in concrete and particular cases.28 They 
thought that individuals just see some specific (obligatory) actions. In fact, 
although these philosophers discussed the idea of self-evidence, they suggested that 
we can think of something like intuitive perception of moral facts when we are 
faced with particular concrete moral cases. 
Ross also seemed to believe that pro tanto duties in concrete situations could 
be self-evident. He thought that the first thing that came to mind was the 
particular pro tanto self-evident duties in concrete cases.29 Consider for example 
this passage from Ross:  
[W]e see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfillment of a 
particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfillment of another 
promise… What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima 
facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by 
reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty 
(emphasis added).30 
Ross thought that the self-evidence of pro tanto rightness or wrongness of a 
particular action comes to our apprehension, even if we do not recognise the 
relevant general moral principle.31 However, by reflecting on different similar and 
dissimilar particular actions we can form self-evident general principles. For Ross, 
                                                        
28 Samuel Clarke, “Discourse on Natural Religion,” in The British Moralists 1650-1800, I. ed. D. 
D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1706 [1969]), 226; Harold A. Prichard, Moral Writings, ed. 
J. MacAdam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 28. This claim might be complex in Prichard. For 
more on this, see Jonathan Dancy, “Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?” in Underivative 
Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, ed. Thomas Hurka (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
29 W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, ed. Philip Stratton-Lake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930 
[2002]), 33. See also, W. D. Ross, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), Ch. 
8. 
30 Ross, The Foundations of Ethics, 170. 
31 For an alternative view, see Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000). 
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these particular moral facts come to our cognition non-inferentially in the sense 
that some particular moral beliefs are credible independently of their inferential 
relations to general moral principles.  
Although Audi calls his intuitionism “Rossian style intuitionism,” his version 
of intuitionism does not say explicitly much about particular moral facts as he 
defines self-evidence in terms of generality. However, I want to highlight one 
element in Audi’s epistemological framework which one might think of as 
something similar to particular self-evidence, albeit he does not say this directly. It 
seems that Audi has something similar to particular intuitions about self-evident 
propositions in mind when he talks about “conclusion of reflection.”32 Since 
intuition can be yielded by reflection, Audi thinks, we are able to distinguish 
between two categories of conclusion, i.e. “conclusion of inference” and 
“conclusion of reflection.” An intuitive self-evident proposition can be the 
conclusion of an inference. Likewise, it can be the conclusion of reflection. 
Audi gives two examples to make clear what exactly this distinction is. 
Suppose someone reads a letter of recommendation that refers to itself as “strong.” 
It is possible to infer that the recommender means “strong” in another way, i.e. 
actually means weak, as the recommender never directly praises the applicant. The 
reader forms the judgement that the recommendation letter is not really a strong 
one by picking some points that show the recommender does not directly praise 
the applicant. Since this judgement is based on an inference from evidence, Audi 
calls this a “conclusion of inference.” 
On the other hand, as an example for “conclusion of reflection,” one might 
see in the letter a subtle commitment and indirect praise. It is possible that one 
simply feels elements of “strength.” In this case, Audi believes, since the judgement 
is made by global intuitive sense and reflection, unlike the conclusion of inference, 
conclusion of reflection is supposed to be non-inferential. In fact, conclusion of 
reflection is a result of reflecting upon the overall nature of some phenomenon, as 
a whole. 
However, it might be objected that although Audi did not directly connect 
the idea of conclusion of reflection to the particular intuition, it seems that 
“conclusion of reflection” cannot be a good example of non-inferential (self-
                                                        
32 It seems that Audi is also somehow talking about self-evident particular moral propositions 
when he talks about the moral properties of fittingness and unfittingness. See Audi, “Intuition, 
Inference, and Rational Disagreement in Ethics,” 482; Robert Audi, “Introduction” and 
“Conclusion,” in The New Intuitionism, ed. Graper Hernandez, 5-7, 181-184. 
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evident) propositions about particular facts or pro tanto duties. This is because a 
conclusion of reflection is drawn by considering all aspects of its phenomenon and 
necessitates considering the phenomenon as a whole. Yet a belief about a pro tanto 
duty necessitates considering just one of an act’s aspects. We need not consider all 
of the action’s features in order to gain knowledge of particular instances of pro 
tanto duties. So, Audi’s conclusion of reflection cannot explain our non-inferential 
beliefs about particular concrete pro tanto duties.33 
This objection is not persuasive though. One can reflect on all aspects of a 
particular situation as a whole, including different self-evident facts about the 
situation. Also, although one could reflect on all aspects of something, there is 
nothing about the notion of reflection that means one must reflect on all elements. 
So, reflection on some part of the situation could be sufficient. 
Nonetheless, it is not clear how Audi can match the distinction between 
conclusion of reflection and conclusion of inference to his Rossian-style 
intuitionism. On the one hand, it seems that the idea of conclusion of reflection is 
closer to Ross’s pro tanto duties than all-things-considered duties. We come to 
beliefs about our pro tanto duties by reflection, not by inference. However, Audi 
thinks that our beliefs about pro tanto duties can be inferential. For example, he 
distinguishes between “justification from below” and “justification from above.” 
The justification from below, in his view, aims to derive intuitively-justified moral 
principles, such as Rossian pro tanto duties, from a more fundamental principle, 
such as the Categorical Imperative.34  
What sounds puzzling in Audi when he introduces the conclusion of 
reflection is that Audi does not give us a clear explanation of what reflection 
amounts to when he says that we can remain non-inferentially justified in 
reflecting on a self-evident proposition. Suppose someone reflects on a particular 
self-evident proposition. It seems that one needs to take account of various 
properties in that particular situation to believe in the proposition. However, in 
Audi’s framework, it is supposed that taking different properties does not require 
                                                        
33 Tropman raises this objection in her “Renewing Moral Intuitionism.” 
34 Audi, “Ethical Reflectionism,” The Monist 76 (1993): 305-306; Audi, “Intuitionism, Pluralism, 
and the Foundation of Ethics,” 119; Robert Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 285; Robert Audi, “A Kantian Intuitionism,” Mind 110, 
439 (2001): 601-635; Robert Audi, “Intuition, Reflection and Justification,” in Rationality and the 
Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi, eds. Mark Timmons, John 
Greco, and Alfred Mele (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 204. 
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someone to form a belief inferentially. How is it possible that, in reflection on 
something such as a situation, we are supposed to take in various properties of the 
thing and then, without drawing any inferences, reach a self-evident truth about 
the thing?  
The objection, in fact, is that it just does not seem plausible that reflection 
does not involve drawing inferences. To understand Rossian principles adequately 
or to reflect on self-evident propositions, we sometimes need to consider and form 
judgements that involve drawing inferences from hypothetical scenarios. This 
leads us to think that inferences drawn play a role as premises for the overall 
conclusion. For example, consider the self-evident proposition such as “when an 
equal amount is taken from equals, an equal amount results.” When one reflects on 
this proposition, one might need to draw some inferences to adequately understand 
it. 
Audi tries to provide an answer to sceptics such as Sinnott-Armstrong who 
raise this issue.35 Audi believes that forming a belief by attaining an adequate 
understanding (or reflection) does not necessarily involve inferences. In his view,  
the perception of a property can ground a judgment without doing so by yielding 
beliefs that supply premises for that judgment. Consider, for instance, facial 
recognition regarding someone you have not seen for many years. If the judgment 
that the person is, say, an old friend from high school, arises from thoughtfully 
contemplating facial properties, but is not based on beliefs of supporting 
propositions, we may call it a conclusion of reflection even if the person could 
formulate ‘corresponding premises.’ The judgment may, then, be both non-
inferential and intuitive.36 
However, Audi’s example of facial recognition is not illuminating, in large 
part because facial recognition is very unlike recognizing the truth of a self-evident 
proposition. Even in contemplating facial properties, it is not clear whether there is 
dependency on a proposition in a way that is in fact not inferential. So, it is not 
obvious that Audi’s move can avoid the objection about inference.  
Nonetheless, it is not true that reflections (or adequate understanding), at all 
times, necessarily involve inferential justification.37 Although there are some 
                                                        
35 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Reflections on Reflection in Audi’s Moral Intuitionism,” in 
Rationality and the Good, eds. Timmons, Greco, and Mele, 19-30. For Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
criticism, see: Hossein Dabbagh, “Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological 
Intuitionism,” Philosophical Forum 48, 2 (2017):175-199. 
36 Audi, “Intuition, Reflection and Justification,” 204. 
37 I occasionally use “reflection” and “adequate understanding” interchangeably here. Although it 
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difficult cases in which reflections explicitly work as an inference, I believe, there 
are still some cases where reflection does not work as an inference. In my view, to 
attain in reflection (or have an adequate understanding) about a proposition, one 
needs: 1) to have at least the capacity to tease out the meaning of the constituents; 
2) to be able to use the terms correctly and apply them reliably; 3) to draw some 
inferences from the proposition in question. In fact, these three conditions 
together make our understanding adequate or reflection sufficient. But none of 
these conditions makes us form an explicit argument or inferential reasoning. 
Hence, although for having a sufficient reflection, one needs to be able to draw 
some inferences, this does not entail that one must actually go through drawing 
inferences when one considers a proposition. Furthermore, even if one draws some 
inferences in order to reflect on a proposition’s meaning, this need not involve 
forming an explicit argument or inferential reasoning. This account of reflection 
makes our beliefs non-inferential. Drawing inferences to form an explicit argument 
or reasoning makes us inferentially justified. But merely having the capacity to 
draw inferences does not cross the line into inferential justification. 
There are clear cases where we have non-inferential belief based on a 
reflection about a proposition. For example, by reflection on the meanings of the 
constituent words in the proposition “all squares are rectangles,” we are non-
inferentially justified in believing the proposition. Reflection on the meanings of 
the words in the proposition is not an argument. On the other hand, for the 
proposition “helium is twice as heavy as hydrogen” we need some proofs, 
inferential reasoning or argument to show that it is true. There are some clear cases 
of reflection without explicit argument. There are some clear cases of reflection 
with explicit argument. I do not deny that, in some cases, it is unclear whether we 
need explicit argument. For example, in the proposition “God probably necessarily 
exists,” it is not clear whether we need an explicit argument or just the ability to 
understand the meanings of the constituent words in order to be justified based on 
reflection. 
This account of reflection and adequate understanding allows us to have a 
direct content when we consider a self-evident proposition. So, it seems more 
likely that we are non-inferentially justified when we form our beliefs on the basis 
of adequate understanding or reflecting on self-evident propositions. Thus, if one 
                                                                                                                      
is possible that one reflects on something without having adequate understanding, I assume here 
that to reflect on something is to understand it adequately and vice versa. 
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believes a self-evident proposition on the basis of reflection or adequate 
understanding, one can non-inferentially know it. 
2.1. An Alternative Account to Audian Self-evidence 
Intuition and self-evidence are two important aspects of intuitionist moral 
epistemology, though most moral intuitionists talked about each of them 
separately. For example, as we have seen, Audi treated intuitions as something like 
belief and defines a self-evident proposition in terms of understanding and non-
inferential justification. Although intuition is a type of mental state and self-
evidence is a property of propositions, we need to discover how they are related. 
Let us start with self-evidence. 
Almost all epistemological intuitionists maintain that there are some moral 
propositions that are self-evident. For example, Locke says that a self-evident 
proposition is one that “carries its own light and evidence with it, and needs no 
other proof: he that understands the terms, assents to it for its own sake.”38 Or 
Richard Price believes that a self-evident proposition is immediate, and needs no 
further proof.39 
However, contemporary moral intuitionists such as Audi and Shafer-Landau 
never include the element of obviousness in their account, and yet they define a 
self-evident proposition in terms of understanding. This definition of self-evidence 
is currently the standard understanding of self-evidence among moral intuitionists. 
For example, Shafer-Landau writes,  
Beliefs are self-evident if they have as their content self-evident propositions. A 
proposition p is self-evident=df. p is such that adequately understanding and 
attentively considering just p is sufficient to justify believing that p. It is possible 
that agents who adequately understand and attentively consider just p may yet 
fail to believe it; for instance, other beliefs of theirs may stand in the way. If I 
have a standing practice of believing whatever my guru tells me, then his say-so 
in a given case may be sufficient to prevent me from believing a self-evident 
proposition that I understand and have attentively considered. Still, if I do get all 
the way to believing a self-evident proposition, my belief is justified.40 
                                                        
38 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 
139. 
39 Richard Price, A Review of the Principle Questions in Morals, in The British Moralists 1650-
1800, II, ed. D. D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969 [1758]), 187. 
40 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence, 247. See also Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical 
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In Shafer-Landau’s view, one’s adequate understanding of self-evident 
propositions is sufficient to justify believing them. On that view, if one adequately 
understands a moral self-evident proposition, such as “it is pro tanto wrong to rape 
anyone,” one’s mere understanding can justify one to believe the proposition. 
However, I believe, it is not plausible that merely an adequate understanding can 
be evidence to justify our belief. Let me explain. 
We can doubt whether adequate understanding of a self-evident moral 
proposition is evidence and can justify our belief in the proposition.41 This is 
because evidence for p must be something that can give us reason to believe that p 
and provide justification for us. For example, the introspective experience of p or 
to remember that p is the sort of evidence that can provide such reasons to believe 
p. But our understanding of a moral proposition is not evidence and cannot provide 
justification for us. Although an adequate understanding of a self-evident moral 
proposition is needed for us to believe in something, it does not look as though that 
adequate understanding is evidence to provide the justification for that belief.  
But this argument depends on what we mean by evidence. One might object 
that understanding a self-evident proposition counts as evidence for its truth, in 
which case my argument is wrong. Or one might object that understanding a self-
evident proposition does not count as evidence for its truth, since self-evident 
propositions can be known true without evidence, in which case, once more, my 
argument is wrong.  
However, such objections are not convincing if we consider my account of 
evidence: Evidence (e) for (p), in my view, is a mental state or proposition that 
raises the (epistemic) probability of p being true. It is true that evidence is indeed 
the existence of a mental state—e.g. that I am in pain, or that such-and-such 
seemed to me to be true. But of course, not all evidence consists in mental states. 
So, I am not denying that evidence can be a fact—e.g. that there is blood on the 
carpet. Nevertheless, I am not using “evidence” to mean merely “whatever justifies 
belief” because then it follows trivially that if understanding justifies then it is 
                                                                                                                      
Character, 216. Audi, The Good in the Right, 48-49. 
41 Philip Stratton-Lake, “Intuition, Self-Evidence, and Understanding,” in Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics: Vol. 11, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Kirchin 
also maintains that intuitionists need to develop a positive account of what understanding of self-
evident propositions amount to. See Simon Kirchin, “Self-evidence, Theory, and Anti-theory,” in 
Intuition, Theory, and Anti-theory in Ethics, ed. Sophie-Grace Chappell (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
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evidence.42 On my account of evidence, mere understanding of a self-evident 
proposition is not evidence, because mere understanding of a proposition cannot 
raise the probability of that proposition’s being true. So, on my account of 
evidence, mere understanding of a proposition cannot be evidence of its truth and 
thus cannot justify our belief in the proposition.43 
If evidence is whatever raises the (epistemic) probability of p, self-evident 
propositions are facts (true propositions) that are inherently evidence. For example, 
the propositions “all cows are female” and “a finite whole is greater than, or equal 
to, any of its parts” are facts that do not need any other propositions to justify their 
truth. They are evidence in themselves. In other words, self-evident propositions 
are credible on their own independently of any other propositions. Indeed, self-
evident propositions are self-justified in the sense that they are justified on the 
basis of their conceptual meaning.  
But if self-evident propositions are facts, can we say that they are all analytic 
propositions? All analytic propositions such as “all triangles have three sides” are 
self-evident. Analytic propositions are propositions whose truth is knowable by 
knowing the meanings of the constituent words and their relation. In fact, in an 
analytic proposition, the predicate concept is contained in its subject concept.44  
But not all self-evident propositions are analytic. Suppose that it is self-
evident that there is a pro tanto duty not to harm others, or at least innocent 
others. In other words, the fact that an act would harm an innocent person imposes 
on any agent a defeasible requirement not to do the act. Is the very meaning of 
“pro tanto duty” such that there must be a pro tanto duty not to harm the 
innocent? No. Is the very meaning of “harm the innocent” such that there must be 
a pro tanto duty not to harm the innocent? No. Is the very meaning of, for 
example, “justice” such that every agent must have a pro tanto duty to promote it? 
No. Is the very meaning of “pro tanto duty” such that there must be a pro tanto 
duty to promote justice? No, and the same applies for each of Ross’s other pro tanto 
duties. Although self-evident moral propositions must be a priori truths, and must 
be necessary truths, they manifestly are not analytic truths. However, depending 
                                                        
42 Loosely speaking, by justification I mean the reason or argument that someone (properly) 
holds a belief. To (properly) hold beliefs is having good reasons to think that they are true. A 
justified belief is one that we are epistemologically or intellectually right in holding. 
43 For more on evidence, see: Simon Schaffer, “Self-Evidence,” Critical Inquiry 18, 2 (1992): 327-
362. 
44 This also can be true of analytic conditionals, e.g. “If Holmes killed Sikes, then Sikes is dead.” 
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on how we understand “moral,” there are some moral self-evident propositions 
that can be analytic as well. For example, insofar as the concept of murder is the 
concept of wrongful killing, the proposition “murder is wrong” is analytic.45  
In addition to that, all self-evident propositions such as “all bachelors are 
unmarried” are a priori. A priori propositions are propositions that one can 
reasonably believe without empirical evidence. A priori propositions are justified 
independently of sensory experience. We can believe an a priori proposition on the 
basis of pure thought and by simple reflection on its content.  
But are all a priori propositions self-evident? Self-evident propositions are 
the foundation for the a priori. That is, although most a priori propositions are self-
evident, there are some a priori propositions that are not self-evident. For example, 
consider a proposition like “all bachelors are unmarried, or Obama’s eyes are blue.” 
The proposition is a priori but it is not self-evident in itself. The proposition “all 
bachelors are unmarried” is self-evident and this can be put in a disjunction with 
any other proposition. The result, however, will be true a priori because a 
disjunction is true as long as one of the disjuncts is true. The disjunctive 
propositions with one true disjunct need not be self-evident, since one needs to 
know logic in order to know that they are true, and indeed needs to do the 
inference: this is a disjunction with at least one true disjunct, and disjunctions with 
at least one true disjunct must be true. As another example, although it is a priori 
that “0.9 recurring equals to 1,” it might be debated whether it is self-evident.46 
Also, for some moral philosophers it is a priori that “happiness is an intrinsic good,” 
but it is controversial whether it is self-evident. So, it is not true that all a priori 
truths, no matter how complex, would come out as self-evident.47 
Thus far, I have elaborated on whether self-evident propositions are analytic 
and a priori. I have also criticised the standard Audian understanding of self-
evident propositions in terms of my account of evidence. It is not plausible, I 
believe, that an adequate understanding of a moral self-evident proposition is 
evidence to justify belief in the proposition. If the adequate understanding of a 
                                                        
45 David Copp, Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40; Elizabeth Tropman, “Self-Evidence and A Priori Moral 
Knowledge,” Disputatio 4, 33 (2012): 459-467. 
46 Elijah Chudnoff, Intuition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 68-69. He thinks it can 
become intuitive after reflection. 
47 For the relationship between intuition and a priori, see Carrie S. I. Jenkins, “Intuition, 
‘Intuition,’ Concepts and the A Priori,” in Intuitions, eds. Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P 
Rowbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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moral self-evident proposition does not provide justification for believing it, the 
Audian self-evidence account is not the whole story about self-evident moral 
propositions. Although having adequate understanding is a necessary condition for 
the self-evidence account, mere adequate understanding is not a sufficient 
condition for that. 
I believe that intuition is the part that can provide justification. However, 
this idea depends on how intuition is understood. My theory of intuition, 
explained below, can help us to distinguish intuition from certain similar mental 
states, such as guesses, gut reactions, hunches and common-sense beliefs. I will 
argue that intuitions are not belief-like states and we should not understand 
intuitions in terms of doxastic accounts. Rather, the seeming account of intuition is 
better. So, I propose a self-evidence theory based upon an account of intuitions as 
seeming states rather than mere beliefs. This theory is an alternative to the Audian 
self-evidence account. 
3. The Seeming Account of Self-evidence  
George Bealer, as a prominent intuition theorist, thinks that intuition is a sui 
generis mental state that cannot be reduced to other mental states.48 He states two 
claims: one negative and one positive. On the negative side, he argues that one can 
have an intuition with certain content while one does not believe that content. 
Also, one can believe that p whereas one does not have the intuition that p. Bealer 
also differentiates between intuition and guess, hunch, judgement, and inclination-
to-believe.49 On the positive side, however, he introduces a new terminology 
instead of intuition, i.e. “intellectual seeming.” 
Following Bealer’s non-doxastic account of intuition, I also understand 
intuitions, either philosophical or moral, as seemings, against the doxastic account, 
which understands intuitions as beliefs.50 According to the non-doxastic account, 
                                                        
48 George Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” in Rethinking Intuition: The 
Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, eds. Michael DePaul and William 
Ramsey (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998). 
49 Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy,” 208-210. 
50 I elsewhere defended the seeming account of moral intuition, although Bealer defended only 
the seeming account of philosophical intuition. See Hossein Dabbagh, “Intuiting Intuition: The 
Seeming Account of Moral Intuition,” Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18, 1 (2018):117-132. See 
also Philip Stratton-Lake, “Intuitionism in Ethics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
ed. Edward N. Zalta (2016). URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/ 
intuitionism-ethics/. 
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to have an intuition that p is to have the intellectual seeming that p. The reason 
that I advocate the seeming account is that it looks more fundamental than the 
doxastic account, e.g. disposition or inclination-to-believe account, in explaining 
different phenomena. Although we can remain open-minded about whether there 
are some cases that the inclination or disposition account explains best, the 
seeming account can do a better job. The reason is that we can explain why we are 
inclined (disposed) to believe various things by saying that they seem true to us. In 
other words, even in cases where we are inclined (or have disposition) to believe 
something, we are actually inclined (or have the disposition) to believe it because it 
seems true to us. In other words, that p seems true to me is a decent reason for my 
believing p. In contrast, that I am disposed or inclined to believe p is not a decent 
reason for me to believe p. 
The doxastic account of intuition does not allow for cases where an intuition 
that p (non-inferentially) justifies a belief that p. On the doxastic account, the 
intuition that p is either the belief that p or an inclination or disposition-to-believe 
that p. Neither of these justifies the belief that p. The belief that p cannot justify 
the belief that p. The inclination or disposition-to-believe that p does not by itself 
justify the belief that p. It might be the case that I know that it is not true that “I 
am inclined to believe that p” but this does not prevent its seeming to me to be 
true. Furthermore, the inclination or disposition-to-believe account is not 
informative about why we should believe that p. Even if one argues that “I am 
inclined to think that p and things that I am inclined to think are very often true. 
So, in the absence of reason to think not-p, I am justified in thinking p,” we are 
entitled to ask why one is inclined to think that p. 
However, the non-doxastic or seeming account of intuition can do this. For 
example, a belief can be based on an intellectual seeming with the same content. 
So, if we regard intuition as defeasible evidence for its content, having an intuition 
that p can justify us in believing that p. Even if the disposition or inclination 
accounts of intuition can work in some cases, seemings can do this job better. 
Having said that, then, we can have a new account of self-evident 
propositions consistent with the seeming account of intuition. I now revise the 
Audian account of self-evidence. In this new account, since intuitions (construed 
as seemings) have the upper hand, the self-evidence account is based on intuition 
but not vice versa. I call this account  
The Seeming Account of Self-evidence: A self-evident proposition (P) is a truth 
such that  
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(a) Attaining an adequate understanding of P gives one an intuition (construed as 
seeming) about P. 
(b) The intuition (construed as seeming) about P, on the basis of an adequate 
understanding of P, is what provides a justification for believing P. 
(c) If one forms a belief about P, on the basis of an intuition (construed as 
seeming) about P, then one knows P. 
But how is it possible that forming a belief on the basis of both an adequate 
understanding and intuition can be remained non-inferential? This certainly 
depends on how we formulate our accounts of adequate understanding and 
intuition. As I explained before, my preferred account of intuition is a non-
doxastic one and the non-doxastic account of intuition does not make our beliefs 
inferential. I also explained how adequate understanding can lead us to be non-
inferentially justified if we construe them in terms of extracting the meaning of the 
constituents, be able to use the terms correctly and ability to draw inferences. For 
example, if I am considering a self-evident proposition, e.g. “All Xs are Ys,” I need 
to adequately understand it, of course. However, understanding it requires at least 
knowing the meaning of “all,” “Xs,” “are” and “Ys.” To know the meaning of a 
concept involves knowing how to use it to make inferences. So, to test whether I 
adequately understand the elements of the self-evident proposition, I might need 
to see if I can use each of the terms to draw inferences. The propositions in which I 
try to use the terms will probably be other than the self-evident proposition whose 
meaning I am trying to adequately understand. This exercise of testing my 
adequate understanding of the concepts in the self-evident proposition I am trying 
to adequately understand is a kind of thinking. But such thinking is not a matter of 
inferring “All Xs are Ys” from other propositions. So, while it is true that I might 
have to test my ability to draw inferences using the concepts in the target self-
evident proposition, it is not true that these inferences are being offered in support 
of, or as arguments to, the target self-evident proposition. 
So, even if we form a belief based on an intuition that is presented (given) by 
attaining an adequate understanding (or reflection), there is no need to involve 
inferences in order to be inferentially justified. Therefore, we can believe a self-
evident proposition on the basis of intuition and adequate understanding while 
being non-inferentially justified. If we have adequate understanding of conceptual 
meaning, i.e. mere semantic understanding, this gives us an intuition (construed as 
seeming) and we take this to be grounds for believing the self-evident propositions. 
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Thus, we have the justification of self-evident propositions on the basis of the 
seeming, which comes from the proposition’s conceptual semantic meaning. 
However, we should bear in mind that the seeming account of self-evidence 
does not entail that all intuitive propositions are self-evident as this is obviously 
wrong. For example, when I say, “I hate this weather” or “it is my duty to help my 
mother when she is in need” or “abortion is wrong,” they are intuitive for me but 
for sure not self-evident. Without this qualification we cannot have a tenable 
account of self-evidence. Not all intuitive propositions are self-evident; only the 
propositions whose seeming true is based on adequate understanding or reflection 
can be self-evident. Nevertheless, there are some basic explanatory intuitive moral 
propositions that normative ethicists consider as self-evident, but which vary from 
one normative moral theory to another. Hence, determining which intuitive 
propositions are self-evident depends on our moral normative theory. But how? 
Many moral intuitionists assumed that belief about pro tanto duties were 
both epistemologically and metaphysically/explanatorily foundational. However, 
there are some moral philosophers such as Tim Scanlon, Robert Audi, Brad Hooker 
and Derek Parfit who think that moral intuitionists do not have a knockdown 
argument that all pro tanto duties have these statuses. They think that pro tanto 
duties might or might not be epistemologically or metaphysically/explanatorily 
foundational. These philosophers think that pro tanto duties are not 
metaphysically/explanatorily foundational because they derive their moral 
justification from the Categorical Imperative, or a Contractualist first principle, or 
a Rule-Consequentialist first principle. For such philosophers, the first principles 
are all the most basic propositions.51  
The seeming account of self-evidence, unlike Audi’s, is not truth-entailing. 
Rather, it is justification-entailing. This is because the seeming account of self-
evident propositions is based on seemings and intuitions in terms of the seeming 
                                                        
51 Note, I am not claiming that what is most basic in terms of normative justification must also be 
self-evident, which is an epistemological matter. Must the first principle be self-evident? Well, it 
must be attractive in its own right, but various alternative candidate first principles are attractive 
in their own right and yet are not consistent with one another. If self-evident propositions have 
to be consistent with one another, then not all these attractive alternative candidate first 
principles are self-evident; indeed, it remains an open question whether any of these are. We 
should bear in mind that being basic or foundational can be an epistemic matter or a matter of 
normative metaphysics. Contractualism and Rule-Consequentialism, for example, cannot be 
plausibly claimed to be epistemologically basic but they are claimed to be foundational in terms 
of the normative justification of rules and actions. 
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account cannot be justified but instead can be explained. Having an intuition 
justifies our belief in the proposition’s content but having an intuition cannot be 
justified. However, one can explain why a certain proposition seems to be true but 
cannot justify its seeming so. 
According to the seeming account of self-evidence, beliefs in self-evident 
propositions that are based on intuition can be justified. We do not need anything 
other than intuitions of such propositions, presented by sufficient understanding, 
to justify our belief in them. However, when we say that self-evident propositions 
can be justified by moral intuition, this does not entail that some other ways of 
justification, e.g. argument, are ruled out. 
The seeming account of self-evident propositions thus provides salvation for 
my favoured intuition theory. The seeming account of self-evident propositions is 
grounded in intuitions as seemings, which I think is the right account of intuitions, 
in contrast to Audi’s account. Nevertheless, we can adopt some elements of Audi’s 
account to explain why sufficient understanding is necessary for having self-
evident propositions. Although it is the intellectual seeming that justifies belief in 
self-evident propositions, the seeming must be based upon sufficient 
understanding. Having sufficient understanding means that we should at least be 
able to extract the conceptual constituents and have an ability to make inferences 
from the proposition in question.   
Seeming must be based upon sufficient understanding because some things 
may seem true to us just because we do not have an adequate understanding of 
them. For example, suppose someone tells a kid: “if all As are Bs, and no Cs are Bs, 
then no Cs are A.” Anyone who adequately understands the proposition can be 
presented by a seeming that the proposition is true. But how can a kid be presented 
by a seeming when the kid does not understand it adequately? 
As another example, suppose that I tell someone, in Persian, that “rape is 
absolutely wrong.” If one does not understand any Persian words, how can one be 
presented by a seeming that the proposition is true? Seemings are presented to us 
based upon our adequate understanding, although this does not make our beliefs 
based on seeming inferential. If by adequate understanding we mean something 
that is not engaged with argument, then seemings and beliefs based on them can be 
non-inferential.  
The seeming account of self-evident propositions can provide us a new 
explanation of what Ross might have in mind about intuition and self-evident 
proposition by putting words into his mouth. Ross did not use the word 
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“intuition.” He often used the word “conviction” instead of intuition. When Ross 
writes that self-evident propositions are “propositions that cannot be proved, but 
that just as certainly need no proof,” he might want to say that the intuitions about 
self-evident pro tanto principles are basic and non-inferentially justified. While 
having intuitions can justify belief in self-evident propositions, the having of the 
intuitions—having the seemings—cannot be justified. Saying that self-evident 
propositions can, but need not, be justified by means of argument is one thing. But 
to say that intuition about those self-evident propositions cannot be justified is 
another thing. Intuitions only give us the explanation of justifiably believing in 
self-evident propositions. We can have intuitions about self-evident pro tanto 
principles when we gain enough mental maturity. Ross, in the same vein, believes 
it is not the task of moral philosophy to justify beliefs about pro tanto duties. 
Rather, the task of moral philosophy is to explain how knowledge and justification 
are possible in ethics.52 
4. Conclusion 
What I have discussed here is some concerns about the account of self-evident 
propositions endorsed by contemporary moral intuitionists (e.g. Audi and Shafer-
Landau). However, I have provided an alternative account of self-evident 
propositions, which I call the seeming account of self-evident propositions. 
Although classic and some contemporary moral intuitionists believe that the 
notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition, I think the notion 
of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings.53 
                                                        
52 Ross, The Right and the Good, 29-30. As a possible similarity, Chappell, for example, seems to 
read W. D. Ross’s view as quasi-perceptual, although Chappell does not mention the seeming 
account. See Sophie-Grace Chappell, “Introduction,” in Intuition, Theory, and Anti-Theory in 
Ethics, ed. Chappell. 
53 I would like to thank Philip Stratton-Lake, Brad Hooker, Sophie-Grace Chappell, and David 
Oderberg, for their helpful and critical comments. 
